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Multilateral development coordination and coherence are elusive goals.  Diverse 
organizations in the international arena struggle to find common ideas on appropriate 
paths to development, common rules to shape interactions among countries, and common 
practices to assist governments in generating policies for economic and social 
development.  Despite advances in each of these areas, development professionals, 
whether in the academy or in practice, have yet to find a focus or a structure that ensures 
that the ideas, rules, and policy advice lead to effective economic and social 
development.
1    
 
In this paper focused on the role of social policy in economic development, I first indicate 
that the search for policy coordination and coherence must take into account the fact that 
ideas about social policy and its role in development have shifted over time, signaling the 
difficulty of finding clarity in approaches to social investment, poverty alleviation, and 
equity.  Definitive responses to social provisioning, poverty, and inequality are likely to 
continue to be elusive; as such, it is important to sustain opportunities for debate, 
experimentation, innovation, and learning in considering approaches to social 
development.  I suggest that finding ways to preserve these conditions, as well as to 
encourage deeper appreciation for the contextual factors that shape development 
outcomes, can be important contributions—however counterintuitive—of new forms of 
international coherence and cooperation.   
 
In a second section of the paper, I indicate how research and practice related to social 
policy and poverty alleviation have left a legacy of a very broad agenda of “things that 
need to be done” for development to occur, along with important unanswered questions 
about how to integrate social and economic development.  These legacies contribute to 
the difficulty of developing overarching solutions to problems of social development and 
poverty alleviation.  At the same time, however, they suggest the fruitfulness of focusing 
more on the distinctions among countries in terms of their capacities, generating ideas 
about priorities and sequences, and working to reduce what is often an overwhelming 
agenda of things that need to be done.    
The third section of the paper provides a description of the political context within which 
social policy choices are made and signals some doubts about how much can be achieved 
at the level of specific countries through greater multilateral coherence and coordination.  
Choices about social policy and poverty alleviation engage a range of international and 
domestic actors with distinct interests and capacities to influence outcomes.  The ability 
of international actors to influence domestic policy decisions varies as policies move 
from agendas, to decisions, to implementation.  Ultimately, no matter what the degree of 
coherence and coordination, domestic politics constrain the best laid plans of 
international actors.     
 
The concluding section of the paper provides an initial reframing of the issue of 
coherence and cooperation by suggesting a few questions of more limited scope.  Instead 
of new big ideas and new paradigms about social development and poverty alleviation, I 
assert that the development community needs to get much better at matching ideas to 
realities, at considering how policy priorities could be assessed in terms of contextually 
specific feasibility, and at generating contextually grounded processes for taking the next 
step.  While these are less ambitious questions than are often asked, they hold some 
promise of bringing ideas into better touch with the real world.   
 
The analysis in this paper will not solve the problems of multilateral policy coherence 
and cooperation, nor will it resolve debates about the role of social policy in 
development.  These limitations are disappointing, of course, but even at a time when 
researchers and practitioners are thinking expansively about the future of development, 
there is value in anchoring such discussions in a world of possibilities and probabilities, 
as well as in a world that we all can agree would be a much better one to live in.       
 
I.  Ideas, Practice, and Crises: The Role of Social Policy in Development 
 
Since the end of the Second World War, researchers and practitioners have been engaged 
in a vibrant discussion of how third world nations become richer through a process of 
economic and social development.
2  Moreover, each generation of development 
professionals tends to rediscover the links between social policy and economic 
development, but often in ways that alter the place of such policies in development.  
Thus, in some periods, social investment is deemed to be a necessary condition for 
economic development and at other times it is more likely to be seen as its consequence.  
Similarly, while social development is generally assumed to be a responsibility of the 
state, the kinds and extent of social provision thought to be appropriate for the state to 
undertake has varied across time.  In addition, in some periods and in some perspectives, 
social policies are primarily focused on the problems of poor countries; at other times and 
in other perspectives, the primary issues of concern are the problems of poor people.   
 
Expectations about the focus and consequences of social investments have thus varied 
over time in relation to ideas about how economic progress is achieved, the role of the 
state in development, and views on the primary function of such policies.  These shifting 
ideas matter, for they have influenced development practice.  They have, for example, led 
  2to altered priorities in national investment strategies, increased or decreased the range of 
social provision measures offered by states, and altered whether universal policies or 
targeted programs are the primary focus of public action.   
 
The experience of putting ideas into practice has in turn generated revised thinking about 
how development is achieved and, over time, ideas and practice have interacted to 
expand, incrementally, the agenda of what needs to be done to ignite and sustain social 
development.  In contrast, severe economic crisis has been responsible for a major 
paradigm shift in mainstream thinking and practice, but one that is now questioned; the 
agenda of what needs to be done has returned to an expansive mode.  What follows is a 
stylized view of these shifting perspectives on the relationship of economic and social 
development, the role of the state in this relationship, and the primary focus of social 
policy—countries or people.     
   
I.1. Early Perspectives on the State and its Role in Development.  The field of 
development can be traced to the 1950s, when the emergence of a number of newly 
independent countries caught the attention of scholars and challenged them to develop 
theories about how economies grow, how social wellbeing is enhanced, and how stable 
political institutions develop.
3  Relatively early, the emergent field of development 
economics became the lead discipline in defining the factors that were important for 
stimulating growth and wellbeing.
4  Early views focused on stages or phases of 
development and grappled with the issue of the role of the state in advancing economic 
and social progress.  Welfare maximizing states, for example, were considered 
appropriate vehicles for acting as accumulators and investors of capital to stimulate 
industrialization and to guide the use of capital in socially productive ways.  Similarly, in 
the apparent absence of other sources of development, the state was thought to be well 
situated to act as an engine for development; growth would result from investments and 
incentives to stimulate industrialization and the expansion of modern agriculture.
5  
Central planning was considered an important means for increasing the effectiveness of 
state action and the allocation of resources, including resources for social development.
6 
 
It is important that the new discipline of development economics emerged in the mid-20
th 
century, in a context of several decades of the expansion of the welfare state in industrial 
countries and the experience of active state intervention in their economies during the 
world depression of the 1930s and the Second World War.  Keynesian economics and 
mid-century practice encouraged the expectation that in developing countries, 
governments should invest in human resource development as an important contributor to 
economic development.
7  Given low levels of development that translated into conditions 
such as low literacy and high mortality, poor countries needed to invest in universal basic 
education, the provision basic public health infrastructure, and basic and universal health 
services focused on lengthening life expectancy and eradicating debilitating and endemic 
diseases.  Such investments, it was affirmed, would stimulate and sustain economic 
development through the growth of productivity expected to result from a more skilled 
and healthy workforce.  The purpose of these interventions was the general promotion of 
human capital development in poor countries, an emphasis that had become a significant 
part of mainstream thinking by the 1960s.
8   
  3 
In the 1950s and well into the 1960s, then, development economics promoted a 
significant role for the state in promoting social development as a condition necessary for 
growth.  This important role for the state was echoed in the literature from political 
science, which emphasized the importance of nation building.  Thus, strong and 
centralized states were seen as an important way to integrate often disparate societies and 
to create common sets of rules, habits of citizenship, and order.
9  In early perspectives, 
the presence of one-party states, reformist military regimes, charismatic nationalist 
leaders, and authoritarian practices were at times viewed as conditions that were 
understandable in efforts to build stronger and more national states and bring order to 
divided societies. 
 
That ideas played such an important role in these early days of focused attention on the 
nature of economic and political development is understandable; disciplines such as 
economics and political science had little data to draw from, other than the histories of 
already developed countries.  Early discussion drew heavily on what was believed to 
have been the development experience of western countries.  In addition, the post-World 
War II experience of rebuilding Europe, in which the Marshall Plan played a leading 
intellectual role, encouraged belief in the important role of international assistance in the 
development process.  
 
I.2. Fractured Consensus and Agenda Expansion.  As experience accumulated in the 
1960s, however, the consensus on the relationship between social policy and 
development began to fracture.  In particular, practice indicated that barriers to economic 
development, to “take off” in the words of some, were more complex than anticipated.  
Numerous structural factors reduced the efficiency of investments in industrial 
development, even while rapid advances were being made in social indicators such as life 
expectancy and literacy rates.  The gradual accumulation of such data encouraged 
scholars to begin to view social development as a process that could advance regardless 
of economic growth and industrialization.   
 
Moreover, in the aftermath of initial experiences observing the impact of ideas in 
practice, the agenda of what needed to be done to achieve economic and social 
development expanded significantly.  In part, an expanded development agenda was the 
consequence of ideas being overtaken by events in the 1960s, as countries were forced to 
deal with a series of issues that loomed much larger than anticipated in earlier periods.  In 
particular, the decade witnessed an unprecedented period of rural to urban migration; the 
beginnings of the growth of mega-cities in some countries; the fast-paced expansion of 
urban squatter settlements; initial concern about the capacity to generate enough jobs for 
new entrants into the labor pool, particularly in urban areas; and increased attention to the 
structural impediments to the development of small-holder agriculture in the tropics.  
Moreover, in politics, the 1960s witnessed significant expansion of mass-based political 
parties and competitive electoral politics in many countries around the world.  Social 
mobilization and the ability of states to respond to increased social demands became 
issues of concern to development scholars and practitioners.
10   
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provision of basic health and education continued to be considered a central 
responsibility of the state.  At the same time, however, many increasingly argued that 
developing countries needed to address constraints on the productive capacity of peasant 
agriculture; invest more in the rapid expansion of public health infrastructure, particularly 
in urban areas; ensure the provision of urban housing and social protection for urban 
workers; address nutritional and social deficits that affected poor people; and attend to 
the imperative for job creation.
11  In practice, policies to subsidize a wider range of social 
services were introduced to promote industrial, agricultural, and urban development.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, then, the range of activities undertaken by states to promote 
social development grew much wider, while their coherence across sectors and countries 
tended to wane.   
 
Agenda expansion was also encouraged in this period by a shift in development thinking 
from how to deal with the problems of poor countries to the problems experienced by 
poor people.  Initial observation of the impact of social development policies, as well as 
research on issues of equality and poverty, emphasized that developing country 
populations were differentially situated to take advantage of economic development and 
that they were differentially affected by development policy investments.  Certainly, poor 
countries needed general investment in the provisioning of health and education, but poor 
countries also contained large numbers of poor people whose access to health and 
education services was constrained by where they lived and how they sustained 
themselves economically.  Their capacity to benefit from development was limited by a 
series of conditions that could be responded to with specialized programs and 
interventions aimed at specific problems, and through alterations in the structures of 
power that limited their access to development.
12  
 
Thus, ideas about social policies expanded to take account of the particular needs and 
constraints that these poor people faced, needs and constraints that made it more difficult 
for them to benefit from growth and investments than better-off people.  Issues such as 
agrarian reform, rural and urban development, basic needs including nutrition and shelter, 
low-income housing, and community development became important issues of discussion 
and action.  As the social agenda expanded, the appropriate role of the state in social 
provisioning also expanded to incorporate many more activities and sectors.  Social 
policy continued to be viewed as an ingredient to stimulate economic development, and 
at the same time to be separable from economic development as a valued end in itself.  
Moreover, it also became an important ingredient in discussions about how to avoid 
social and political instability.  Similarly, countries that made significant advances in 
social development were thought to be investing wisely in the future potential for 
economic development.               
 
At the same time that the social agenda expanded and became more multifaceted in 
addressing the constraints faced by poor populations in developing countries, discussions 
about what needed to be done to stimulate development became more fractured and 
contentious through the emergence and popularization of a radical critique of mainstream 
ideas.
13  This critique emphasized that, due to economic and political conditions in the 
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th century, the development of new economies would be fundamentally distinct from 
that experienced by earlier developers; extrapolating from the history of European 
countries, scholars had ignored basic contextual differences between early and late 
developers.  Instead, international trade relationships, colonialism and its aftermath, and 
the economic and political relationships between first and third world countries, as well 
as the distribution of economic and political power in the domestic politics of developing 
countries, indicated that basic power relationships had to be altered if third world 
countries were to be able to develop.     
 
In order to progress, then, countries would have to break the constraints that led to 
underdevelopment—radical restructuring of ownership, for example, the conquest of 
political power, and the mobilization of societies to participate in their own development.  
Practice was important in reshaping these views—the Cuban Revolution, conflicts of the 
Cold War being fought out in Africa and Asia, and reflections on the “take off” of Japan 
were explained and incorporated into paradigms of development as part and parcel of 
conditions of underdevelopment.  In this radical critique of mainstream theory, social 
development would be a consequence of altered power relations and would be a direct 
responsibility of a state committed to equality of conditions.  While this critique was 
never appropriated into mainstream development discourse, it did encourage mainstream 
research to pay more attention to international constraints in development.    
 
The expanded role for the state, the expanded social policy agenda, and the expansion of 
concerns about poor people and the constraints they faced in overcoming poverty 
continued to characterize development thinking in the 1970s.  A considerable research 
agenda uncovered data about inequality and populations that were disadvantaged by 
development, in turn often adding to the agenda of what needed to be done to address 
poverty and powerlessness.
14  Women, pastoralists, ethnic minorities, remote 
populations, slum dwellers, landless rural laborers, the urban underemployed—all 
became subject to discussions about inequity.
15  In addition, due to research on the 
impact of exogenous shocks on poor populations—largely encouraged by the impac
the rapid rise in international oil prices—scholars began to consider issues of the risk
faced by poor people and the importance of policies that would cushion them against 
unanticipated shocks.  Research on poverty similarly emphasized the vulnerability of 









16  Thus, the social development agenda was enriched by 
research and new insights at the same time that the signals about “what to do” became 
more comple
 
I.3. Questioning the Role of the State.  As these discussions continued, a neoclassical 
revival in economics began to be reflected in development economics by the mid 
1970s.
17  While in practice development continued to call for states to grow and to 
assume ever increasing roles in economic and social development, empirical eviden
began to accumulate about the destructive capacity of states as engines of growth and 
providers of social development.  Simultaneously, scholars focusing on political 
development in the mid and late 1970s became increasingly alarmed by evidence of th
consequences of authoritarianism and centralization in the politics of many develo
  6countries—corruption, brutality, military rule, and political repression took center stag
in much political science focused on developing count
18
e 
ries.    
 
Far from being engines of development and nation builders, then, states began to be 
viewed as a major constraint on development, with extensive intervention crippling 
opportunities for economic development and strong central states developing the capacity 
to repress authentic voices of citizens and their interests.
19  For economists, a neoliberal 
revival began to see rent-seeking, corruption, and predatory states as the outcome of an 
excessive role assigned to the state in economic development.  Political scientists 
fundamentally altered their earlier and more benign perspectives on military regimes, 
one-party states, and charismatic leadership.  Regime transition and the consolidation of 
democracies emerged as major concerns in literature and conferences.
20   
 
These altered views had an impact on how social policies were viewed in terms of 
economic development.  Now, greater attention was focused on the impact of social 
investment rather than on the needs for such investments.  As part of an emerging critique 
of the role of the state in development, scholars and practitioners began to pay more 
attention to issues of how services were delivered, the extent to which their delivery was 
biased by corruption and clientelism, and the failures associated with ineffective or 
corrupt bureaucracies and their lack of capacity.  The costs of social services, coupled 
with research on failures in delivering them effectively, fueled discussion of corruption, 
bias, and incompetence.  The question of the positive role of social policy in development 
tended to fade in the face of this developing critique, even while development practice 
saw an increasing “projectization” of social policy interventions, in which a few national 
policies were joined by a large number of focused project interventions for specific 
purposes, the result of a continuously expanding agenda and expansion in development 
assistance. 
 
I.4. Crisis and Paradigm Shift.  This very significant shift in development thinking, with 
roots in the 1970s, became a mainstream paradigm quite quickly as a result of an 
international economic crisis in 1982.  Massive debts of countries around the world and 
states floundering under their burden encouraged the promulgation and adoption of a 
series of radical policies to deregulate, liberalize, and downsize government.  From a 
fractured view of what was needed to encourage development, the neoliberal era put 
economic growth clearly in the forefront of development objectives, stressing 
macroeconomic stability and fundamental structural change from state-dominated to 
market-oriented economies.
21  In this new paradigm, markets rather than states were 
needed to ignite growth; previous emphasis on the role of the state was fundamentally 
flawed; social development was important, but could not be achieved in the absence of 
growth.  Certainly for much of the 1980s, development thinking stressed that states were 
the problem, not in any way a solution, to generating growth and wellbeing.
22   
 
Moreover, the new paradigm was clear that failures to generate growth meant that states 
could not afford the extensive array of social policies and projects that had become 
common in the 1960s and 1970s.  To deal with inflation, debt, and the fiscal crisis of the 
state, states needed to curtail their spending significantly, and spending for social 
  7development loomed very large in national budgets.  Thus, a return to basics with a much 
more concerted focus on the efficiency of basic social service delivery characterized this 
period.  With a paradigm focusing on growth and the role of markets, a history of practice 
in which public spending far outstripped public revenues, and a deep concern about 
corruption and incompetence in the delivery of services, social policies were 
subordinated to the need for growth.  In this increasingly dominant view, only through 
economic growth could countries afford to provide for social development expenditures.   
 
Indeed, the 1980s were a very difficult decade for the social sectors—budgets for 
education, health, and public health were slashed, issues such as housing, nutrition, and 
urban and rural development simply fell off the agenda, and multiple investments at the 
project level survived only through mechanisms such as the social development funds 
that were adopted more for political reasons than economic ones.  In some parts of the 
world, this was the “lost decade” not only in terms of growth but also in terms of 
advances in social development.  The neoliberal paradigm, deeply suspicious of states, 
encouraged experimentation with alternative means of providing for social welfare 
through privatization, contracting out, assessing fees for services, and sponsoring NGO 
activities.  Overall, this period witnessed a return to a social policy agenda that focused 
broadly on the basics in poor countries.  The particular needs of poor people much less 
important in the neoliberal view, and often responses to such problems were channeled 
through specialized social adjustment programs.
23   
 
I.5. A Return to Incremental Agenda Expansion.  The decade that was initiated by a 
world economic crisis in 1982 was notable for cutbacks in social welfare spending and a 
gradual deterioration in the quality and quantity of public services provided to citizens in 
many countries.  Nevertheless, even as neoliberal thought and practice fundamentally 
altered the agenda of what needs to be done to stimulate development, a critique—based 
in part on observation of the impact of neoliberal policies on social provisioning—began 
to emerge by the late 1980s.  Characterized by Tony Killick as A Reaction Too Far, the 
anti-statism of the neoliberal paradigm shift of the 1980s was attacked.
24  While 
emerging reactions to “market fundamentalism” acknowledged that markets needed 
the primary movers of economic development, states needed to provide a series 
institutions and services that would encourage markets to be effective and efficient.  Law 
and order and property rights—long the basic neoliberal expectations about what states 
needed to do—expanded to include more than a focus on downsizing, deregulating, and 
privatizing; revised thinking began to encompass a positive role for the state in providing 





Research on the experience of the East Asian “miracles” played an important role in the 
intellectual debate—some of these countries had very active and interventionist states 
that stimulated rather than constrained growth.
25  In addition, the application of 
neoliberal shock therapy as Russia moved to a market economy without a set of 
appropriate institutions in place, increased the visibility of the “new institutional 
economics,” a perspective emphasizing the importance of well-established rules of th
game to the proper functioning of markets in economics, politics, and organizational 
behavior.
26  That Douglass North won the Nobel Prize for economics in 1991 for his 
  8work on institutional economics added to the critique about the over-zealousness with 
which the neoliberal paradigm was adopted and put into practice.
27  The 1991 World 
Development Report included a chapter on the state, an important sign of the 
rehabilitation of a positive role for the state in mainstream discussions of development; 
the 1997 Report was focused on the state in development. 
 
An important characteristic of the development discourse of the early and mid-1990s, 
therefore, was the increased awareness of the importance of effective public 
bureaucracies and stable institutions of governance for market-based development to 
proceed.  It was not enough to “get the policies right;” an appropriate institutional 
infrastructure would be essential for generating investment and growth.  Not surprisingly, 
early discussions focused on institutions that were considered directly relevant to the 
operation of markets—the judiciary, central banks, tax authorities, ministries of 
finance—but gradually, the idea of investment in human resources reemerged as part of 
the appropriate task of the state in the promotion of development.  Nevertheless, 
throughout this period, development researchers and many practitioners emphasized the 
social provisioning would be largely a consequence of economic growth; as countries 
expanded their trade and investment policies and strengthened their institutions, they 
would grow and thus have increased resources to invest in social policies.
28 
 
Meanwhile, in political science, where intellectual disillusion with authoritarian regimes 
of various kinds had been growing, social policy acquired new importance.  In part, 
social development returned as a more important ingredient of the development agenda 
because the “third wave” of democratization had brought a resurgence of democratic 
regimes and greater concern about whether such regimes could deliver benefits to 
citizens.
29  Politicians, encouraged by the programmatic or clientelistic commitments of 
their parties, faced the discipline of periodic elections with promises to expand social 
provisioning.  The mobilization of voters, and even the legitimacy of democratic regimes, 
were important reasons why politicians needed to be more concerned with 
responsiveness.
30  This encouraged a reinstatement of the importance of social 
investments as a critical obligation of the state.   
 
Equally important in the 1990s, a strong “third sector” voice of non-governmental 
organizations and civil society groups emerged to attack neoliberal policies and the 
impact of the lost decade of social investment on citizens and on the poor in particular.  
This activist movement focused attention on increases in indices of poverty, the cost of 
ignoring social provisioning, the rights of citizens to a variety of services, and the human 
destruction caused by the cold hand of the market.  During the 1990s, a plethora of real 
world voices pushed against the dominant paradigm and eventually helped force a 
reconsideration of the role of the state.  Indeed, agenda expansion of the 1990s and 2000s 
owes much to the advocacy of various groups who promoted the importance of issues 
such as the environment, human rights, security, and human capabilities to social 
development.
31  These voices were validated through research on human development 
and human capabilities, well presented in the annual Human Development Reports of the 
United Nations Development Programme.
32   
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mainstream development discourse had adopted a renewed appreciation of social policy 
in economic development, but one chastened by the experience of states that had grown 
too large, spent too much, and delivered too little in earlier periods.  Yes, in a new and 
complex mainstream perspective, states needed to provide a range of social services—but 
these services needed to be efficiently provided; could be stimulated to be more effective 
and efficient through the private provision of some of them; should be decentralized to 
capture benefits from allocative efficiency, information on local preferences, and local 
demand for performance; and should be monitored for evidence of corruption, 
clientelism, and ineffectiveness.
33  At the same time, the list of what needs to be done to 
ensure social development expanded noticeably.  Research from the 1990s on indicated 
that poverty had increased under neoliberal policies, urban poverty was increasing, and 
income inequality was mounting.
34  It was not difficult for development professionals to 
conclude that more needed to be done to address the problems faced by poor people.  
Issues such as social housing, nutrition, and rural development found their way back onto 
the social agenda of the 2000s. 
 
Thus, after a decade of limiting social provisioning to essential public services and 
seeking means to simulate markets in their design and delivery, and a decade of rising 
intellectual concern and action about evidence of widespread poverty, the 2000s could be 
characterized by renewed agenda expansion, activities to enhance the capacity of the state 
to deliver essential services, and a renewed focus on the needs of poor people.
35  Social 
policies were further distinguished from economic development and became identified 




At the same time, the neoliberal paradigm left behind important concerns about 
corruption and the effective delivery of social services.  Building administrative capacity 
for social policy delivery, decentralizing service provision, as well as new experiments 
with conditional cash transfers as a way of generating demand were all aimed at 
strengthening the link between investments in social sector services and the payoff in 
terms of enhanced education, health, and, importantly, poverty alleviation.  Demand for 
effective services could be generated by providing citizens with incentives to send their 
children to school and to ensure that citizens had regular preventive health care.  The 
experience of countries such as Brazil and Mexico in the early development of ideas 
about cash transfers accorded well with a growing appreciation that it would be possible 
to improve services through demand generation and more direct means to reach poor 
people.
37     
 
In the 2000s, then, important new ideas and practices—demand stimulation, efficient 
allocation of resources, decentralization of services, conditional cash transfers, micro-
credit to encourage access to markets and asset accumulation by the poor, social 
insurance for the poor, randomized experiments to discover what works, the idea of 
social inclusion and exclusion—joined on-going ideas about the social provisioning role 
of the state to generate new policies and new programs.
38  The renewed attention to 
poverty alleviation, building on efforts from the 1990s, also expanded the range of social 
  10actions undertaken by states. Added to these trends, rapid globalization fed concerns 
about economic immigration in search of jobs, and the potential for rapid global spread of 
communicable diseases further underscored the return to social policy as an instrument of 
development.  That scholars and practitioners increasingly argued that social policy was 
integral to the solution of global problems such as the climate change, energy security, 
international trade, security, governance, immigration, and other major issues further 
complicated thinking about social policy and development.  Moreover, another level of 
complexity was added in a growing critique about the utility of international development 
assistance.
39     
 
Thus, the agenda for social development was extremely broad at the outset of the 2010s, 
its relationship to economic development not universally agreed, and the concerns of 
advocates extremely diverse.  This agenda was rich with demands, competing voices, 
experimentation, new ideas, divided interests, on-going criticism of mainstream thinking, 
and the legacies of prior thinking and acting about development.  For researchers and 
practitioners alike, one question is inescapable: Where could we go from here? 
 
II.  Where Could We Go from Here? 
 
In Section I of this paper, three questions underlay the assessment of the evolution of 
thinking and practice in social policy and poverty alleviation: What is the role of social 
policy in economic development? What is the appropriate role of the state in social policy 
provisioning? and, Should the focus of concern be poor countries or poor people?  The 
ensuing and stylized view of shifting responses to these three questions suggested some 
conclusions that are relevant to the discussion of multilateral development coordination 
and coherence.   
 
First, achieving an integration of social and economic policy requires a clear statement, 
currently lacking, in how social policy advances the development of countries.  
Experiences on the ground are diverse enough to make such a statement difficult to agree 
upon.  Second, a renewed consensus on the role of the state in social policy must to be 
tempered by increased awareness that states differ in terms of their ability—and 
willingness—to take on tasks of development.  Third, and related, because the poverty 
and social exclusion of people now takes center stage in concerns about policy, the trap 
of an ever increasing agenda is a real one that must be addressed.  One important way to 
keep agendas within reason is to focus more on country-specific strategies and a clear 
sense of priorities.  This section of the paper develops these three points. 
 
II.1. Integrating Social and Economic Development Policy.  As indicated in the 
previous section, social and economic development were integrated goals of early 
thinking about how countries could become wealthier.  As experience and ideas changed, 
however, they tended to become separate foci and research and practice encouraged 
specialization and compartmentalization of thinking and practice.  Currently, some are 
questioning this separation, as the focus of WESS2010 indicates.   
 
  11The challenges to a more holistic view of development are great: academic and applied 
specializations have grown up to support and increase specialization of focus; the 
macroeconomics of how countries fare in development are very difficult to integrate with 
the micro-focus of current research and practice in social policy and poverty alleviation; 
discussions of growth imperatives are difficult to combine with assertions about human 
rights; and the acknowledgement of complexity sits uneasily with grander integrating 
themes.  In addition, the difficulty of reconceptualizing the integration of social and 
economic development is evident in the cases of a number of countries that have distinct 
experiences and whose development trajectories do not lead to easy 
compartmentalization as successes or failures.  It is a challenge to draw clear lessons 
from their different trajectories.   
 
II.1.1. Social Development in Costa Rica, Sri Lanka, China, and Kerala.  Costa Rica, 
Sri Lanka, China, and Kerala state in India are four cases in which policy makers made 
significant commitments to social investments at early stages of development, focusing 
on a broad improvement of welfare as a foundation for future economic growth.  Indeed, 
social indicators made impressive progress in each of them as their governments invested 
in broad policies for education, health, infrastructure for public health, and nutrition.  In 
the 1960s, and with the exception of China, whose experience was largely rejected 
because of its basis in communist ideology and authoritarianism, these cases were often 
used to demonstrate the wisdom of broad commitment to social development and poverty 
alleviation and efforts at inclusive development.  Key to their success in improved social 
conditions, it was argued, were leadership commitment to this goal and political 
organizations and ideologies that generated broad public support for it.   
 
Yet Costa Rica, Sri Lanka, and Kerala were often referenced in the 1980s as examples of 
policy commitments that resulted in slow and unsustainable development; social policies 
and poverty alleviation, it was claimed, had been pursued without adequate attention to 
economic growth.  Thus, while each of the three cases generated relative progress in 
social indicators, their economies did not demonstrate a clear trajectory of growth and the 
burden of financing social investment was seen as a factor in constraining growth.  This 
evidence was used to argue that economic growth was an essential first step toward 
sustainable social investment.   
 
More recently, perspectives on this experience have shifted again, at least in the case of 
Costa Rica and China.  While Costa Rica has still not been successful in generating rapid 
growth, its experience in investing in human development—particularly education—is 
credited with its ability to take advantage of global technological and biotechnological 
advances to develop a range of industries and research activities that ensure it important 
niche markets in the world.  The case of China, although not often viewed through the 
lens of the payoff to earlier social policy investment, is certainly an example of rapid and 
sustained economic growth that was, in part, supported by the ready availability of a 
literate and healthy labor force.  Thus, that there might be a longer term pay-off to early 
investment in social development has been recently rediscovered in debates in 
development.   
 
  12II.1.2. Social Development in Brazil and South Africa.  From the 1950s through the 
1960s, Brazil and South Africa focused attention and investment primarily on generating 
rapid economic growth.  Both were relatively successful and could show strong records 
of growth for sustained periods of time.  Yet both countries were also frequently used 
examples of extensive inequality and poverty, attention to the health and education needs 
only of restricted elites, and growing evidence of gaps between the wealthy and the poor, 
in both cases—but particularly and deliberately in South Africa—exacerbated by very 
significant racial divides.  In much discussion of poverty and development, even in the 
1980s and 1990s, these countries were held up as evidence that a focus on economic 
growth could result in worsening conditions of social welfare for extremely large portions 
of the population,  
 
More recently, however, Brazil and South Africa are credited with having made major 
progress toward more inclusive development.  Indicators of health and education seem to 
support the wisdom of current policy initiatives to direct increased resources to the social 
sectors and both countries are in the forefront of discussions about policy innovation in 
social development.  In particular, Brazil has become famous for its experiences with 
conditional cash transfers, and South Africa, despite many problems, has demonstrated 
results from very progressive policies for overcoming historical racial differences in 
health, education, and employment.  This experience, then, supports a model of growth 
first with a subsequent focus on social investment, even while acknowledging significant 
costs of social inequality that must later be overcome.   
 
II.1.3. Social Development in Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia.   
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan—well known as East Asian Tigers—and 
Malaysia—a Little Tiger—are perhaps the best examples of countries that have been able 
to bring economic and social development policies into significant alignment.  Early 
investment in broad national policies for education and health, combined with concern 
for equitable distribution of land in South Korea and Taiwan, were combined with clear 
national policies focused on generating rapid economic growth.  While much recent 
analysis of their development success has focused on the trade orientation of their 
economic development policies, it is clear that these countries also established and 
maintained commitment to the broad provision of social policies and were able to 
improve the quality of social services as they progressed toward greater economic 
development, an extremely difficult achievement.  A focus on equity in the cases of 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Malaysia was encouraged by political concerns about ethnic 
divisions. 
 
The experiences of these countries are impressive, all the more so as they have been 
sustained for long periods of time.  The lessons they provide for other countries are 
important.  Yet these lessons need to be tempered with an understanding of the 
importance of country context in explaining development success.  All four countries had 
strong national leadership that was important in defining a broad development strategy; 
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan embarked on these strategies in a relatively 
supportive international economic context; and each had relatively strong states vis-à-vis 
the power of domestic social and economic groups.  They were thus in a strong position 
  13to set national policies, to experience early benefits from them, and to be able to sustain 
these choices over a significant period.  All but South Korea faced significant challenges 
of internal conflict related to ethnic distinctions.  For contemporary analysis of the role of 
social policy in development, these cases provide good examples of what might be 
achieved, but it is not at all clear that the conditions that allowed for the success of these 
four countries can be replicated elsewhere. 
 
II.1.4.  What Lessons?  These case experiences create a conundrum in terms of being 
able to establish a clear statement of how social policy relates to economic development, 
particularly when contextual factors are considered.  Thus, from these few examples, it is 
debatable if an obviously superior model for integration or sequencing of social and 
economic development is evident, at least one that is replicable.  Lessons from history 
can be ambiguous, then.  This suggests a possibility explored in the next part of this 
section—that a universal model of integrated social and economic development and 
poverty alleviation might not be particularly useful because states vary considerably in 
their needs and capacities.   
 
II.2. The Role of the State in Social Policy.  Although the issue of a model for 
integrating social and economic development more effectively remains a conundrum, the 
review of development thinking in Section I of this paper indicates that there is a 
consensus about the importance of the state in advancing development.  The fall-out of 
neoliberal excesses in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as improved understanding of the role 
of institutions in development, in fact, have brought new respect for how states can 
advance development.   
 
At the same time, development scholars and practitioners are newly and increasingly 
aware that states differ in terms of their capacities for developing and pursuing strategies 
for development and governments differ in their interest in doing so.  Even while broad 
commitments to human development are increasingly stressed, the mechanisms about 
how individual countries are to achieve these goals are more subject to debate.
40  As 
indicated above, the development successes of a number of East Asian countries were a 
result of strong, developmentalist states that made good decisions at opportune moments 
domestically and internationally; there is reasonable doubt, therefore, about the ability to 
replicate these conditions in many other countries.  Equally, experiences of extremely 
low capacity, political incoherence, and on-going warfare have infused discussions of 
development with concerns about fragile states, failed states, displaced populations, and 
communal violence.
41  Thus, increasingly, mainstream thinking has acknowledged more 
space for diverse approaches to social development, emphasizing that there is no one 
right solution for the distinct conditions of a variety of countries. 
 
II.2.1. Assessing What Can Reasonably Be Expected from Counties.  This perspective 
is a good basis for considering how development thinking and practice can advance in the 
area of social development: states are important to economic and social development yet 
states differ in their capacities.  Development research and practice needs to make more 
of the new consensus around these two issues in advancing social policy and poverty 
alleviation goals.  One of the most important advances that could be made is to be much 
  14more adept at aligning what is desirable with what is possible in terms of individual 
countries.  By contextualizing development strategies, the activities taken on by states at 
different levels of capacity are more likely to be feasible and to be less overwhelming of 
existing capacity. 
 
At a relatively simple level of analysis, for example, there are countries that have the 
capacity to take on complex tasks of development and to make considerable advances in 
social and economic welfare. Some such countries have states that can be considered 
“developmental,” in the sense of states that have internal coherence, that have the 
capacity to select development strategies appropriate to time and conditions, that enjoy 
sustained political support for these choices, that have public bureaucracies able to take 
on such tasks effectively, and that can learn from their experiences as a basis for altering 
policies and strategies.  Clearly, many of the East Asian countries would fall into this 
category.  But there are also other countries that are capable of taking on quite complex 
tasks in the design and delivery of social policies and the alleviation of poverty, and that 
have shown good progress in doing this.  Countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Chile, South 
Africa, Colombia, and some states in India may fit into this category.     
 
Other countries—some in the Middle East, Ghana, Botswana, the Philippines, Peru, 
Uganda, Thailand, a number of states in India might be cases in point—have the capacity 
to develop and pursue less complex and more focused strategies, while still being able to 
make significant progress toward social development and poverty alleviation.  These 
countries have the foundations for relatively coherent states and the capacity for planning 
and implementing a range of social and economic policies, although each faces difficulty 
in mobilizing political support for national strategies and policies and the organization 
and capacity of public organizations is far from optimal. 
 
There are also countries whose capacities and context suggest that social and economic 
development are long up-hill struggles.  African countries such as Burkina Faso and 
Tanzania and small countries such as Nicaragua and Honduras in Central America may 
be good examples of states that are weak and that have only limited capacity and political 
consensus for moving forward with any effective development strategy.  For such 
countries, the selection of a few priority areas of state action, based on a rigorous 
examination of resources and capacities to act can help limit the potential for 
overwhelming existing capacities, increasing wasted resources, and contributing to all-
too-frequent policy failure. 
 
And some countries may be close to stateless, with extremely limited capacities for 
embarking on any long-term strategy for development—Afghanistan, Haiti, the Central 
African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Yemen, for example.  
In such countries, the focus may need to be on interventions to establish minimum 
conditions of security and order, the establishment of legitimate state power, and the 
effective use of humanitarian assistance.  Certainly, the ways in which these interventions 
are planned and achieved have important long-term consequences for how states emerge 
and develop the capacity to generate development, but it is also clear that efforts to 
ensure ambitious goals such as inclusive development are almost certain to fail when 
  15states have collapsed, are extremely fragile, or when they are in the rent by on-going 
violent conflict. 
 
II.2.2 Assessing States as They Are.  A simple point—states differ in their capacities to 
take on complex tasks of economic and social development—should be the basis for 
assessing the requirements of distinct kinds of strategies and policies and aligning them 
with the existing capacities of individual states.  Developmental states exist in current 
practice.  In many countries that cannot currently boast of these kinds of coherent and 
capable states, the ability to move toward them can be systematically obstructed by 
insisting on long lists of what must be done, by policy advice that is not assessed 
carefully for feasibility, and by a failure to consider not only capacities but also priorities 
for social and economic development.  Thus, an important step toward the creation of 
more effective developmental states is a clear recognition of existing conditions and 
capacities.  End goals—the creation of coherent and politically stable states—are 
important for visions—but these goals are not advanced by development strategies that 
attempt to take on all issues in contexts of limited capacity.   
 
II.3. The Agenda Issue: People not Countries.  Over time, thinking in the area of social 
development has increasingly privileged concern about the status of poor people over a 
more general concern about the status of poor countries.  As a consequence of research 
and practice, the development community is extremely sensitive to the fact that social 
needs are great in developing countries and the range of vulnerabilities of poor people is 
extremely broad.  Indeed, as indicated in Section I, as data, research, and reflection on 
practice have expanded, there has been a long term trend toward agenda expansion in 
social policy, punctuated, as we have seen, by a period of significant paradigm change.  
In particular, the growing importance of the idea of human development and the 
discussion of human rights and social policy indicates interest in increasing the extent to 
which poor people, in particular, can expand their capacities to live full and productive 
lives. 
 
Thus, as we have seen, one consequence of the very valid concern with human 
development has been a long term trend toward agenda expansion in the social sectors, a 
trajectory that underscores the issues raised above about drawing distinctions among 
countries in terms of their abilities to take on complex tasks of development.  A 
significant danger for many developing countries is, as suggested above, is the possibility 
of being overwhelmed by what needs to be done when the human and resource 
foundations for doing it are limited.
42  Indeed, in promoting a comprehensive agenda, 
many international development agencies and advocacy organizations have acted to 
overload the fragile capacities of some states, and have contributed to policy failures 
when extensive expectations of moving in many directions at once are not met.
43     
 
Once people, not countries, have been acknowledged to be the appropriate goal of social 
development, it is difficult to limit agenda expansion.  But the solution to this problem is 
not to abandon concerns for the welfare and rights of people.  Instead, the agenda of what 
needs to be done needs to be organized much more around attention to issues of getting 
from here to there.  In such a perspective, concern about the process of how states and 
  16countries get from here to there would be much more prominent.  Process development 
and attention to priority setting might then replace simple statements of the end goals of 
development.     
 
International development coherence and cooperation can help re-frame issues of social 
development through less aspirational and more realistic goal setting.  For example, 
aligning international coherence with national coherence could be advanced by 
approaching country assessments not on the basis of needs—an approach that tends to 
expand agendas beyond the capacity of many countries to deliver—but on the basis of 
capacities for implementation.  The international discourse can become more explicit in 
concerns about agenda expansion, setting priorities, and matching policies with the 
capacity to deliver.  International agencies need to agree to commit resources to priority 
areas in specific countries—and to find ways to help countries make good choices about 
what those priority areas are.  If this is taken as a measure of international coherence and 
cooperation, it is clear that approaches such as the PRSP process may actually contribute 
to agenda expansion and the destruction of fragile capacities that might have been better 
used had they been employed with a clear eye to feasibility.   
 
An important role for international actors, then, is to find ways to encourage countries to 
take the most useful next steps toward greater development at any given time.  In 
particular, this means that advances in coherence and cooperation at international levels 
need to be used to advance coherence at national levels—and that what coherence means 
will differ across countries.  In this case, the assessment of policy content (what needs to 
be done to be developed) should not lead but follow assessments of capacities, priorities, 
and the need to focus limited resources.       
 
III.  Coherence and Cooperation: How Effective a Tool? 
            
International actors—primarily researchers and development agencies, but also 
international NGOs—are important in setting agendas in development and in influencing 
the role of social policy in development.  Indeed, they have often been dominant actors in 
shaping and reshaping the discussion of what needs to be done for economic and social 
development to occur.  Yet there is significant need for caution in expectations about how 
much international coherence and cooperation can achieve at country-specific levels.  
The influence of international actors is conditioned by how decisions are reached in 
national politics, and, even if there were greater international coherence and cooperation, 
the pull of domestic politics would still condition choices and results.   
 
The politics of the policy process are complex and they differ across countries.
 44  
Nevertheless, there are some general patterns that tend to characterize the development of 
new social policies and the alteration of old ones in a large number of countries.  In 
particular, the dynamics of decision making in many developing countries tend to 
privilege executive leadership and the participation of technical experts, both domestic 
and international.  In this context, the role of international development agencies can be 
extensive; these organizations often bring ideas and funding to the table, and both 
resources can influence outcomes of agenda setting, policy design, and decision making.  
  17At the same time, domestic actors tend to have increased capacity to constrain 
international influences when policies are negotiated with diverse interests.  This 
characteristic is even more apparent during the implementation of social policy, when the 
capacity of domestic actors to influence the allocation of social policy resources and the 
distribution of services is extensive.
45  Expectations about the consequences of greater 
international coherence and cooperation thus need to be viewed in terms of a politics of 
policy making and implementation.         
  
III.1. Decision Style in Policy Making.  In very general terms, policy making in 
developing countries tends to be more executive-focused, more insulated from public 
debate, and more centralized than similar activities in institutionalized Western 
democracies.
46  Despite increased democratization and efforts to decentralize political 
power in recent years, decision making in many countries remains more top down than 
distributed among agencies, levels of government, and varieties of interests.   
 
Executives are generally initiators and designers of policy.  In many countries, long 
traditions of presidential leadership and centralized power tend to diminish the role of 
legislatures in the design, and often the negotiation, of public policies.  While this 
dynamic is changing as democratic competition opens up a larger role for legislative 
political parties, a legacy of executive dominance of decision making and policy initiative 
remains important in a large number of countries.  Poorly developed staffing, clientelism, 
and frequent electoral calendars may also limit the extent to which legislatures play 
important roles in the design and negotiation of policy contents.  When policies become 
fragmented and projectized, the approval of legislators may even be avoided entirely.   
 
In addition, and again in very general terms, interest groups and civic associations of 
many kinds often tend to be less fully organized and prolific in developing countries than 
in more developed ones, increasing the distance between government and the capacity of 
interest groups and citizens to be engaged in debates over the contents of policies as they 
are being designed.
47  Similarly, political parties are often more clientelistic than they are 
programmatic, which tends to focus their actions and concerns more on the distribution of 
policy benefits during implementation than on broad ends of policies as they are being 
designed.  Think tanks, actors that often play key roles in policy debates in a number of 
developed countries, are often incipient actors in developing countries, less present and 
less knowledgeable about the policy process.  The same can be true of the media.  
Professional associations and unions of providers—very important actors in determining 
the outcome of policies—can be left out of the loop in the policy design process, and end 
up having the most capacity to influence policy during implementation.  
 
As a consequence of such conditions, policy decision making in many countries is 
relatively insulated.  In practice, this tradition tends to increase the role of technical and 
academic expertise in the design of social policy.  In brief, presidents or ministers tend to 
indicate policy preferences and appoint technical teams—also known as design or reform 
teams—to develop proposals in line with these preferences, and only when proposals are 
relatively well developed will they be presented to cabinets, ruling juntas, legislators, or 
the press.
48   
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In turn, the composition of the technical teams and their role as gatekeepers in 
discussions and negotiation of policy proposals tend to be important factors in the politics 
of policy design.
49  Their disciplinary training will often have a significant impact on 
how policies are designed; economists and engineers may have very different ways of 
thinking about education or health policy and approaching their design than educators or 
doctors, for example.  Similarly, technical teams tend to make important determination
about who should be invited to the table to discuss alternatives in the content of new 




50  The range can be broad or narrow; the important feature of the discussions, 
however, is the extent to which design teams play this important—and political—gate-
keeping role.  Moreover, their political role may be enhanced by factors such as their 
commitment to the political leaders who appointed them.   
 
Moreover, when decision making is relatively closed, issues of capacity may not be well 
integrated into thinking about the delivery of services.  The real world test of what is 
feasible may be overlooked as policy designers and decision makers devise elaborate 
mechanisms to allocate resources and to monitor services.  The importance of training 
may be overlooked, and overly optimistic scenarios about logistics may make their way 
into expectations about how policy will be implemented.  In the real world, the failure of 
timely delivery of textbooks, chalk, medicine, and medical supplies has undermined a 
surprising number of good ideas.
51  Thus, a dynamic of executive centeredness can mean 
that social policy development is less attuned to characteristics of administrative and 
political capacity actually to deliver the policies.  The relatively strong influence of 
international assistance agencies early in the process of agenda setting and policy design 
can thus even contribute to the potential for policy failure. 
 
III.2. Who’s at the Table When Important Decisions Are Made?  Metaphorically, the 
content of policies is determined by a set of actors “at the table” when important 
decisions are made.  Obviously, policy making is an on-going and iterative process, and 
there are not one but several tables.  Nevertheless, the table metaphor helps illuminate the 
political economy of what gets chosen as policy and who is consulted in this process.  
The question of who’s at the table is critical to what interests and perspectives have a say 
in policy choice and which tend to be excluded.      
 
As indicated above, technical and academic experts tend to be important actors at the 
table, and they may have particular political, personal, and disciplinary commitments that 
affect their perspectives.  International actors with technical expertise also tend to be very 
present at the table, and to have perspectives on what needs to be done to resolve social 
policy challenges.  Frequently, they are the voice of mainstream development thinking as 
it is translated into plans for action.  They also represent the perspectives and resources of 
particular agencies, and their understanding of the development discourse may be 
important in terms of their willingness to commit resources to a particular problem.  
Their influence at the table therefore tends to be enhanced by implicit or explicit offers of 
funding to promote particular approaches to social problems.
52   
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part of the technical team or as representatives of the administrative roles they play in 
policy development and implementation.  Often, social policy is extremely fragmented in 
terms of organizational responsibilities, so this means that there may often be several 
competing ministries, agencies, and programs at the table at the same time.  In addition, 
some ministries may also represent the interests of particular professional or workers’ 
groups, such as doctors, teachers, or lower level officials.  This is so because in some 
countries it is not unusual for those who represent particular organized interests to be 
regularly appointed to leadership and other positions within ministries; in the most 
extreme cases, ministries may even be “colonized” by powerful unions or professional 
associations.
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Many relevant interest groups are less regularly at the table, even though they are often 
powerful in domestic politics.  For example, health professionals and paraprofessionals, 
teachers’ unions, and associations of engineers and architects, and others involved in the 
delivery of services represent large numbers of stakeholders and they are often associated 
with particular political parties.  Teachers, health professionals, administrators and others 
also tend to represent middle-class or aspiring middle-class interests, and they tend to be 
influential in local communities in election campaigns and other politically relevant 
activities.  But the extent to which they are at the table tends to reflect the extent to which 
these associations are part of a support structure for governing parties or whether they 
represent a mainstream or a marginal opposition.  They are almost always consulted if 
they are part of a governing party or coalition, at times consulted if they are prominent in 
the opposition, and rarely consulted if they are considered part of a “fringe” political 
opposition.
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The extent to which domestic and international NGOs are represented in policy decision 
making is often limited.  In general, governments tend to be skeptical of such 
organizations and the interests they represent, thus discouraging the extent to which they 
are invited to the table or are part of design negotiations.  Such organizations, in turn, are 
often skeptical of the objectives of governments and may even be reluctant to be 
officially part of policy discussions.
55  At times, if they are at the table, it may only be at 
the insistence of international development agencies.  Moreover many potentially 
influential actors—such as organizations representing the interests of better off sectors of 
the population—have limited interest in social policies because they have increasingly 
opted for private providers of services.   
 
Domestic and international economic interests can also be very relevant actors for social 
policy—construction firms and their associations, pharmaceutical groups, manufacturers 
and distributors of equipment for hospitals and schools, and so on—but these associations 
are rarely consulted or formally invited to the table.  Similarly, representatives of local 
and regional governments are often expected to play important roles in the delivery of 
social services, particularly in eras such as the current one in which decentralization is 
encouraged.  Rarely, however, are they formally represented in policy decision making. 
Finally, it is extremely rare for those representing the direct beneficiaries of social 
  20policies—parents and patients, for example—to be present when policies are being 
decided upon.
56   
 
An important characteristic of social policy making in many countries, then, is that those 
who are most important to the delivery of social policies are not always on board when 
new policy initiatives are presented to a legislature or when they are announced as new 
policy.  They may have little information about the policy initiatives and little 
understanding of their purpose.  These characteristics of policy making can add to the 
tentativeness and contentiousness of policy implementation, and to the potential for 
redefinition, slippage, and sabotage when policy is being put in practice. 
 
III.3. Implementing New Policies.  Social policies are usually administratively complex 
and resource- and action-intensive in terms of how they are delivered.  As a consequence, 
social policies are particularly prone to implementation challenges.  Yet, most policy 
analysis focuses on the design and approval of policy and assumes that subsequent action 
is primarily a matter of administrative engineering.  From a political perspective, 
however, the process of implementation often places social policy objectives in great 
jeopardy.  Indeed, implementation is a highly political process in most countries, a 
process that can reshape, scuttle, redirect, destroy, or otherwise alter the intent and impact 
of policy.
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As we have seen, for example, a relatively closed decision making process can translate 
into the absence of many of those with a stake in the outcome from discussions of design 
and the negotiation of policy contents.  As a consequence, the considerable power of 
these actors, important among whom are administrators and service providers, tends then 
to become focused on the implementation of policy and a variety of forms of resistance to 
change can be employed.  Foot-dragging, misinterpretation of the intent of policy, failure 
to act, stumbling on technical details, and other such quiet measures of resistance can 
characterize administrative responses to new social policy initiatives.   
 
Service providers can similarly slow and distort implementation through failures to act.  
Organized providers also have the capacity to employ more public measures of 
resistance, such as strikes or the threat of strikes, public protests, and the use of their 
privileged positions in society to influence public opinion.  Clearly, resistance to new 
social policies is likely to be directed at policies that impose burdens on administrators 
and providers or that alter their power, a point returned to below.   
 
In addition, social policies tend to provide divisible benefits – schools and clinics, for 
example, or admission to school or a visit to a doctor or nurse, a vaccination, a school 
textbook, allocation of public housing, etc.  In what tends to be a highly competitive 
market for such benefits in poor countries, clientelistic political parties often flourish.  Of 
course, not all parties cohere around the distribution of benefits to their constituencies or 
gather force from voters by promising and delivering individual and community-based 
“pork,” but it is certainly a common practice in many countries—developed and 
developing.  Under such conditions, the allocation of social policy services can be 
distorted to certain individuals, certain communities, certain regions, or partisans of 
  21particular parties—all to the detriment of those not part of these constituencies.  In 
practice, policy resources may not end up in the hands of their intended beneficiaries, or 
beneficiaries may differ depending on electoral outcomes. 
 
Moreover, many of those who are critical actors in the process of policy development 
lose their capacity to be influential during policy implementation.  Thus, after critical 
decisions have been made about the content of new policies and after formal approval has 
been gained for them, designers and policy makers at the center tend to lose control over 
the destiny of these policies.  They have other issues to contend with, their influence over 
the administrative apparatus may be shallow, or they may be voted out of office, replaced 
by others with distinct agendas and concerns.     
 
Often, then, power shifts downward in a political system during implementation.  
Particularly where social service provision is decentralized, and where policy making has 
been relatively closed and top-down, actors such as governors, mayors, NGOs, local 
community interlocutors, and others may not necessarily have been on board when the 
policy was designed.  If service providers have not been consulted, they may also have 
significant incentives to use their resources to distort implementation.  The fate of 
policies may now be much more in their hands.  Their perspectives and orientations 
become paramount in determining whether and how well a policy will be implemented.   
 
In contrast, and despite conscious efforts to avoid this result, international actors lose 
much of their influence during implementation.  Their capacity to intervene in 
administrative processes, to deal directly with political parties, unions of providers, or 
local governments is severely constrained.  Consequently, they have a difficult time 
exerting much influence over the destiny of policy initiatives once these initiatives have 
been designed and approved.
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III.4. Social Policies Are Often Contentious.  The contents of social and poverty 
alleviation policies are important because they determine how different actors will align 
in support or opposition to such initiatives, their perspectives significantly shaped by the 
distribution of anticipated benefits and costs if new policy is adopted.  Policy proposals 
are inherently political, even when developed in the academy in technically sophisticated 
ways.  In particular, some social policies—those that are primarily focused on the 
expansion of access—are more likely to enjoy the support of diverse actors than are those 
that are primarily focused on improvements in the quality of services.
59  In practice, 
whatever the ideas behind social policy interventions, there tends to be a political bias in 
favor of more services rather than higher quality ones.
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The following table indicates differences in the political dynamics of policies that 
enhance access and those focused on quality enhancement.  Basically, access-oriented 
policies increase the benefits offered to a variety of potential constituencies—more jobs 
for administrators and service providers, more contracts for school and clinic builders and 
for textbook and medicine suppliers, more members and dues for unions when more 
teachers or nurses are hired, more tangible benefits for politicians to claim credit for, and 
more physical evidence of government presence for voters to reward.  As a consequence 
  22of these broadly evident benefits, important interests—administrators, contractors, 
unions, politicians, parties, and voters tend to be supportive of policies that increase 
access to services. 
 
Table 1 
The Politics of Access and Quality Reforms: 
A Comparison 
  Access  
Reforms 
Quality-Enhancing Reforms 
Typical actions to carry out 
such reforms 
•  Build infrastructure 
•  Expand bureaucracies 
•  Increase budgets 
•  Hire administrators 
•  Hire service providers 
•  Buy equipment 
•  Improve management 
•  Increase efficiency 
•  Alter rules/behavior of 
personnel 
•  Improve accountability 
•  Improve performance 
•  Strengthen local control 
Typical political implications of 
such reforms 
Creation of benefits: 
•  Jobs 
•  Construction and 
provisioning contracts 
•  Increased budgets 
•  Increased power for 
ministries and managers 
Imposition of costs: 
•  Loss of jobs 
•  Loss of decision making 
power for some 
•  New demands, expectations, 
responsibilities for others 
Typical political response to 
such reforms 
•  Unions of providers welcome 
reforms and collaborate with 
them 
•  Politicians welcome tangible 
benefits to distribute to 
constituencies 
•  Communities are pleased to 
receive benefits 
•  Voters support changes 
•  Unions of providers resist 
reforms 
•  Administrators seek to ignore 
or sabotage change 
•  Many politicians wish to 
avoid promoting reforms 
•  Many voters are unaware of 
changes (at least in the short 
term) 
Typical long-term political 
consequences of these political 
dynamics 
•  Unions of providers grow 
larger and gain greater 
political voice 
•  Politicians and political 
parties become focused on 
the distribution of tangible 
and divisible benefits 
•  Communities and voters are 
responsive to clientelistic 
practices 
•  Unions of providers are 
significant veto players in all 
social policy reforms 
•  Administrators lack 
incentives to address 
performance issues 
•  Access reforms are default 
policy choices for politicians 
and political parties  
•  Middle class voters exit to 
private markets for social 
provisioning 
Source: Elaborated from Grindle 2004:6. 
 
This perspective alters significantly in policies whose main import is to improve the 
quality of services.  Managerial “tightening up,” emphasis on efficiency, reallocation of 
authority, higher expectations about performance and accountability, new mechanisms of 
oversight and rewards and penalties related to salaries and career trajectories, fewer 
resources for infrastructure, greater engagement of citizens in monitoring—these are all 
aspects of quality enhancement that tend to impose burdens on those most important to 
  23the delivery of services.  Administrators are likely to resist loss of authority, jobs, and 
resources.  Providers are likely to resist new standards of performance and accountability 
and politicians may not wish to incur their disapproval.  In addition, quality enhancement 
is less tangible and immediate than physical infrastructure or supplies of medicines and 
textbooks, so politicians find such policies less attractive to support and voters may not 
be aware of gradual improvements in quality.   
 
Moreover, when social policies have expanded rapidly but have lagged in quality, middle 
class beneficiaries often exit to private markets for social services, thus diminishing the 
potential influence of a social sector that has historically been extremely important in 
developed countries in demanding better quality services.  And, for a variety of reasons, 
it tends to be more difficult for poorer constituencies to demand effective service 
delivery—they tend to be less organized and less articulate politically.  Not surprisingly, 
then, building more schools or clinics often becomes a default position for governments 
committed to social provisioning, and the cycle of improved access but poor quality may 
thus be reinforced.
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III.5. The Responsibilities of Constrained Power.  This political perspective on the 
content of social policy also implies significant constraints on international actors 
promoting policy coherence and coordination for enhanced social wellbeing.  Even when 
there is a high degree of international coherence and cooperation, domestic politics 
related to the allocation of costs and benefits limit the extent of international influence.  
Ultimately, what international agencies can achieve is constrained by the characteristics 
and political implications of the policies they choose to promote.   
 
This political perspective also emphasizes that the strongest cards that international actors 
have to play are those related to the ideas and resources put behind the pursuit of these 
ideas in policy design.  Indeed, international cooperation agencies have invested heavily 
in research on development, both in-house and contracted-out to academic institutions 
and researchers, and have been important consumers of new insights developed within 
academic disciplines—particularly economics—and the dissemination of these ideas 
through scholarly publications, training, and advising.  In particular, the role of 
publications such as the World Bank’s World Development Report, and the United 
Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Report have codified the 
findings of mainstream research, drawn lessons from that research, and engaged in 
important debates that question the implications of research and experience.  
 
Considerations of how to achieve greater coherence and cooperation present the potential 
for strengthening the hands of the players that hold important cards of ideas and 
resources.  But it is important also that increased capacity to speak with one voice also 
increases the accountability that international actors assume for the ideas they adopt.  In 
the search for policy coherence and cooperation, then, international actors have an 
obligation to be cautious in advocating new ideas and relying overmuch on the results of 
academic research that have not faced a real world test.  Many familiar with the past 60 
years of development thinking and the role of international actors can identify a strong 
tendency for new ideas to become fads or even magic bullets for development, promoted 
  24through exaggerated promises of the benefits of “participation,” “basic needs,” “getting 
the policies right,” “markets,” “decentralization,” “good governance,” and other such 
concepts.   
 
Greater international coherence and cooperation can be a dangerous goal if they are 
coupled with a strong belief in recipes for development, unexamined best practices, or 
one best way success stories.  Section I of this paper was clear in indicating that ideas 
change over time and “getting it right” is always a work in progress.  Moreover, “getting 
it wrong” can be responsible for significant human and economic costs, such as when 
market-oriented policies are promoted and adopted without due concern for their 
limitations, the institutional underpinnings they require, or the lives of those who are 
harmed by them.  Similarly, assertions that there are best practices and success stories 
that can be emulated without attention to contextual factors can be a significant chimera 
in development.
62  It is also a very seductive chimera, because it promises good results in 
a world fraught with uncertainty, frustration, failure, and the need for very long time 
horizons.   
 
Development remains a protracted, frustrating, difficult, and often elusive process and 
countries differ fundamentally in their resources, capacities, opportunities, and histories, 
causing them to have diverse responses to policy choices and practice.  International 
actors are particularly influential in the realm of ideas about what needs to be done.  
Thus, if greater coherence and cooperation is achieved, it comes with a special obligation 
to keep ideas within reason, to ensure a certain humility in the dissemination and 
popularization of new approaches to social policies, and to exercise caution in 
championing perspectives that have not had time to face the test of practice.  Thus, one 
important—and counterintuitive—implication for more effective coherence and 
cooperation is that international cooperation agencies must remain sensitive to the 
evolution and diversity of ideas that are considered in the promotion of social 
development.  
 
IV. New Paradigms and Old Realities 
 
It is possible that this paper, written as a background note for WESS2010, will be 
unwelcome to the authors of that report.  At a basic level, it calls into question the idea 
that generating a new paradigm for development will provide helpful responses to the 
wide range of economic and social challenges that a very broad range of countries 
currently face.  By indicating the way in which ideas about development alter and change 
and are a consequence of the interaction of research and practice, it suggests that the 
ability to come up with overarching responses to development challenges is limited.  Big 
ideas have been important in the evolution of development thinking and practice, but 
their history also demonstrates a need to understand development as a process in which 
learning and change occur.  While today’s big idea does not necessarily become 
tomorrow’s albatross, movement toward international coherence and cooperation should 
incorporate means for learning from practice, flexibility, and adaptation to changing 
circumstances.  
 
  25Similarly, this paper suggests that because there is currently greater awareness of the 
diversity and contextual realities of developing countries, big ideas about development 
may not address the particular needs of countries with different capacities to take action, 
or different degrees of interest in doing so.  Instead, the paper suggests the need for more 
focus on the link between the current capacities of individual countries and the choice of 
policies they can feasibly embark upon.  The paper, then, indicates the need for more 
rigorous examination of specific cases and responses to social policy issues that are 
particularly relevant to particular cases.  The results of such an approach will have an 
impact on policy—careful assessment of what might work in particular contexts is an 
important factor in policy innovation, as the experience with conditional cash transfers 
suggests. 
 
This paper also raises some unwelcome thoughts about international development 
coherence and cooperation.  Achieving these worthy goals could possibly result in less 
vibrant debates about how development occurs, even in the potential for notions about 
development to become frozen in time, as can happen when large numbers of actors take 
on similar perspectives.  When international actors are more able to speak with one voice, 
particularly about what needs to be done, the potential for their increased influence is 
counterbalanced by increased risk that the policy advice and guidance offered might be 
inappropriate or not fully adjusted to national or local realities.  The paper also suggests 
that even with greater coherence and cooperation, the capacity to affect social 
development policy outcomes is constrained by domestic political processes, interactions, 
and conflicts. 
 
In several ways, then, this paper presents a contrarian view to expectations about 
WESS2010.  Throughout, it suggests that choices about social policy do not reflect an 
easy translation of ideas into practice, that ideas are often not well-grounded in the 
complexities of reality, and that international cooperation agencies cannot always exert 
effective influence in the pursuit of social policy within countries.  These are likely to be 
unpopular conclusions—and with good reason.   
 
They do, however, offer a different perspective on what might be the big ideas that guide 
social development policy and poverty alleviation.  For example, a bold departure from 
practice might be to advocate for greater attention to the complex and contextually 
specific interplay of ideas, actors, institutions, and process as ways to encourage social 
development progress.  A useful role for international actors would then be to develop the 
frameworks and approaches that help fit aspirations to realities on the ground.  Likewise, 
such an approach can set the basis for much greater capacity to assess priorities and 
ground strategies in country capabilities.  This is largely unexplored territory.  Thus, to 
balance the extraordinary amount of effort that is put into research and practice on long 
lists of what needs to be done, international coherence and cooperation could help 
generate clearer thinking about country specific questions like: What should be done as a 
next step and what are effective means to take this step?   This would be an important 
contribution to development thinking and to the effectiveness of international actors in 
the promotion of social development and poverty alleviation.  The big idea, then, would 
frame a discussion of next steps. 
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In a similar vein, the assessment of the role of social policies in economic development 
might be restated in very concrete terms: given the situation in a particular country with 
regard to social development and the opportunities available for economic development, 
how might these goals be brought closer together?  Rather than trying to define the 
optimal role for the state in social policy and poverty alleviation, why not develop tools 
for considering the most effective ways to employ limited, modest, or more extensive 
state capacity and to assess opportunities for other mechanisms for social development—
relying on NGOs or the private sector, for example—as a consequence of this analysis?  
The big idea, then, would be to frame a discussion of next steps toward a better reality.  
 
For many, of course, this may not be an exciting way of proceeding to frame a debate in 
development.  Yet, reframing questions in these equally difficult but perhaps less 
ambitious ways offers an opportunity to bring ideas and possibilities in the real world into 
greater alignment.  Unfortunately but inevitably, this world is characterized by imperfect 
information, changing circumstance, frustrated initiatives, and differential power and 
influence.  Searches for international coherence and cooperation need to be fully 
embedded in an appreciation of this difficult reality.  
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